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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Over the last decade, the Colombian military has successfully 
rolled back insurgent groups, cleared and secured conflict 
zones, and enabled the extraction of oil and other key 
commodity exports. As a result, official policies of both the 
Uribe and Santos governments have promoted the armed forces 
to participate to an unprecedented extent in economic activities 
intended to consolidate the gains of the 2000s.  These include 
formal involvement in the economy, streamlined in a 
consortium of military enterprises and social foundations that 
are intended to put the Colombian defense sector “on the map” 
nationally and internationally, and informal involvement 
expanded mainly through new civic action development 
projects intended to consolidate the security gains of the 2000s. 
 
However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than 
through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated 
the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with 
reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups.  
 
It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight 
mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with 
illegal armed groups.  This is particularly important if Colombia 
intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security 
model to other countries in the region.    
 
The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms 
to enhance state capacity, institutional transparency, and 
accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are 
crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic 
politics.  Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association 
between the armed forces and criminal groups should 
complement that agenda, including the following: 
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 Champion breaking existing ties between the military 
and paramilitary successor groups through creative 
policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards 
directed at the military; 
 
 Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug 
traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter 
of course the possibility of Colombian military 
collaboration.  Doing so rigorously may have an 
important effect deterring military collusion with 
criminal groups 
 
 Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all 
military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups; 
 
 Reward military units that are effective and also avoid 
corruption and criminal ties by providing them with 
enhanced resources and recognition; 
 
 Rely on the military for civic action and development 
assistance as minimally as possible in order to build 
long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce 
opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to 
criminal groups circulating in local populations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is not uncommon for militaries in Latin America to have 
roles that shape national economic development.  In many 
cases, playing a role in development is included formally 
among the armed forces‟ missions.  However, the case of 
Colombia is unique in the region.  Formally its mission is 
defined in terms of defending national sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and constitutional order with no mention of a role 
in the economy.
1
  Yet the military has played a profound role 
in shaping the national economy particularly during the last 
decade, through successful prosecution of the 
counterinsurgency and through clearing and securing of 
territory, which has enabled expansion of natural resource 
extraction and brought new resource rents into State coffers.
2
  
While the insurgency is not entirely eradicated and illicit 
drug production in the hands of illegal armed groups remains 
on the dark underside of the national economy, the 
government is now attempting to consolidate the political 
and economic gains made in the last decade. 
 
Those gains were achieved mainly through a concerted 
military policy and expansion of military capabilities and 
manpower enabled in large part through Plan Colombia 
assistance from the United States.   As a result, the 
government has promoted the armed forces to participate to 
an unprecedented extent in both formal and informal 
economic activities that are seen as a key to using military 
presence to build State presence.  Formal involvement in the 
economy has been streamlined into a consortium of military 
enterprises and social foundations that are intended to put the 
                                                 
1
 The military‟s mission is defined in Article 217 of the National 
Constitution. 
2
 Nazih Richani, “Multinational Corporations, Rentier Capitalism, and 
the War System in Colombia,”  
Latin American Politics & Society 47:3 (Fall 2005), 113-144. 
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Colombian defense sector “on the map” nationally and 
internationally.  Informal involvement in the economy has 
grown as the military has taken up civic action development 
projects, along with continuing to provide security at oil 
facilities to protect production of the country‟s most valuable 
export commodity.
3
 
 
In addition, military involvement in illicit activities persists, 
particularly collusion with drug trafficking organizations 
(DTOs) that is a legacy dating back to the 1980s of 
collaboration between the military and paramilitary groups.  
Yet in an environment where public officials and politicians 
at every level have been implicated in sharing information 
with and taking money from paramilitaries and DTOs, the 
military is not alone in such collaboration.
4
  With about 350 
cases of military collaboration with narco-paramilitary 
                                                 
3
 Private oil corporations have commonly contracted with the military to 
provide protection for their facilities in Colombia.  In addition, the US 
government began providing non-drug related military equipment and 
training to the Colombian military in 2003, with $98 million dedicated to 
the dual task of securing the Caño-Limón oil pipeline and combating the 
insurgency in Arauca; additionally Ecopetrol and Occidental Petroleum, 
which jointly operate the pipeline, pay over $17 million annually to the 
Colombian military for their security work. U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, Security Assistance:  Efforts to Secure Colombia’s 
Caño-Limón-Coveñas Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but 
Challenges Remain, GAO-05-971 (Washington, DC, 2005) 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05971.pdf  
4
 The Parapolitics scandal has implicated dozens of national politicians in 
accepting bribes from narco-paramilitary groups, and the DAS 
(intelligence agency) spying scandal points to government officials as 
high as the president‟s office authorizing illegal wiretaps of 
Constitutional Court judges to undermine investigations in the 
parapolitics cases.  Most recently the former director of the DAS in the 
Uribe administration was sentenced to 25 years for providing 
paramilitaries with intelligence on labor and leftist activists who were 
later assassinated; “Former Colombian Spy Chief Noguera gets 25-year 
Sentence for Paramilitary Collusion,” The Washington Post, September 
14, 2011. 
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groups in a military that numbers over 260,000, the military 
does not seem to be the country‟s worst perpetrator of illicit 
ties.   
 
However, one of the main conclusions from this study is that 
given the expanding prominence of the Colombian military 
in State-sanctioned economic activities – which sustains its 
wartime presence in local communities and increasingly 
brings it into contact with the private sector and with military 
or police forces from other countries – it is imperative to 
enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial 
penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups.  This is 
particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its 
new practice of exporting its security model to other 
countries in the region.    
 
The paper continues with a brief conceptual framework for 
analyzing formal, informal, and illicit economic activities 
that militaries in Latin America have typically undertaken.  
The second section examines major features from the 
Colombian case in each of those areas.  The final section 
suggests several policy recommendations that follow from 
this study.  
 
FORMAL, INFORMAL, AND ILLICIT ACTIVITIES 
 
Latin America has a long history of militaries playing a 
variety of roles in the economy.  Military economic activities 
can take a number of forms that are usually driven by 
strategic imperatives the military seeks to remedy, and by the 
opportunity to work with (civilian) allies in getting the 
project underway.
5
  In some cases military 
                                                 
5
 Kristina Mani, “Military Entrepreneurship in Latin America: A Brief 
Overview,” WHEMSAC Monograph, Applied Research Center/Florida 
International University, Miami, FL June 2010; Mani, “Military 
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“entrepreneurship” has resulted in the creation of significant 
State industries that likely would not have emerged from 
civilian initiative alone (e.g., Brazil‟s industrial and defense 
sectors in the 1940s-70s).  Yet for the most part, as a 
contemporary practice military involvement in the economy 
raise important concerns about the professional integrity and 
the sustained social and political influence militaries in the 
region wield.  For instance, critics have pointed out that 
economic interests can empower the military with increased 
institutional autonomy, with a privileged access to State 
resources and contracts, and with leadership roles over 
civilian agencies that can undermine the achievement of 
democratic civilian control of the armed forces.
6
    
 
A useful way to understand how militaries in contemporary 
Latin America still play roles in the economy is to consider 
activities that are formal, informal, and illicit.  Formal 
activities typically involve the military-as-institution in 
ownership or management of enterprises, for instance in 
agriculture, industry, and service sectors of the economy, 
including through military pension funds that invest their 
equity in real estate, corporations, world markets, etc.  
Formal activities are legitimated through national laws, 
usually the constitution or the military‟s organic law, or the 
organizational directives of the defense ministry, though 
transparency and accountability do not necessarily follow.   
 
Informal activities are subject to political conditions, policy 
considerations, or “allowed” practices rather than to explicit 
law; they can bring former or active duty military personnel 
into strategic public administration positions; or involve the 
military collectively as an agent of economic development 
                                                                                                    
Entrepreneurs:  Patterns in Latin America,” Latin American Politics and 
Society 53:3 (Fall 2011), 25-55. 
6
 Consuela Cruz and Rut Diamint, “The New Military Autonomy,” 
Journal of Democracy 9:4 (1998), pp. 115-127. 
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through civic action projects and the provision of security to 
the private or public sector; or place military units in 
situations where they develop direct relationships with local 
communities for exchanging goods the military needs or 
produces. 
 
Illicit activities involve active duty members of the military 
in unlawful behavior that brings them some form of profit 
they are able to achieve through their military affiliation, for 
instance their access to controlled weapons or classified 
intelligence, or their ability to use or withhold the use of 
force.  Along with judicial protection, these are the most 
significant State “resources” criminal groups need to keeping 
operations going. 
 
COLOMBIA:  INNOVATING FROM WARTIME 
SUCCESSES 
 
Dating back to 1958, Colombia can be considered one of 
Latin America‟s longest enduring electoral democracies, 
despite the guerrilla insurgency it has fought since the 1960s 
that has on several occasions held large portions of 
Colombian territory.  In the 1970s and 1980s, the growth of 
the cocaine industry became a new aspect of the conflict, and 
the guerrillas‟ gains through collusion with drug traffickers 
spurred the rebirth of an old Colombian phenomenon, 
landowner-controlled paramilitaries.  By the 1990s, the 
illegal armed groups had taken the initiative from a State in 
which even the president was tainted with drug ties and the 
armed forces were identified more as allies of the 
paramilitaries and human rights abusers than as effective 
fighting force.   
 
However, the influx of major U.S. military assistance 
through Plan Colombia in the 2000s allowed Colombian 
forces to dramatically expand manpower and capabilities, 
8 
 
allowing the government of Álvaro Uribe to claim the 
successes of virtually decimating the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla insurgents and 
demobilizing the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of 
Colombia (AUC).  Yet while the FARC indeed has been 
reduced to about a third of its size in 2000 (it now has about 
5,900 forces), its decline has created space for paramilitaries 
to reconstitute themselves and focus on criminal activities 
rather than on fighting the insurgents.  In short, security 
conditions have improved particularly around Bogotá and in 
the eastern departments that long were FARC strongholds, 
but overall state and citizen security is far from consolidated.  
Moreover, numerous political corruption scandals have led 
to the judicial investigation of over 100 officials at every 
level of government.  In particular, the parapolitics scandal 
(paramilitary groups hand-picking political candidates and 
funding their campaigns) and the related DAS scandal 
(systematic illegal surveillance of justice officials by the 
national intelligence agency, DAS, on orders of the 
president‟s office) have damaged the apparent achievements 
of the 2000s.
7
  It is in this context, that the Colombian 
military has achieved greater prestige and funding than at 
any time in the previous century, making it a valuable bread-
winner for the state and economic agent of the state. 
                                                 
7
 For a critical overview, see Adam Isacson, “Don‟t Call it a Model,” 
Washington Office on Latin America, July 14, 2010 
http://justf.org/files/pubs/notmodel.pdf   
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Source: Colombia PR Travel Information, http://colombia-
pr.com/colombia-maps.html.   
 
Formal Economic Activities 
Following the counter-insurgency achievements of the 
2000s, the Colombian government has extended the 
military‟s security role to encompass the goal of locking in 
those gains.  As a result, the defense ministry in 2008 
restructured the collection of enterprises that had long been 
run by the military into a single Social and Business Defense 
Consortium (Grupo Social y Empresarial de la Defensa, 
GSED) formally overseen by the ministry.  Comprising 18 
10 
 
defense and social enterprises traditionally associated with 
the military, GSED functions as “a supportive system” for 
the Public Forces (military and national police) and seeks to 
“project itself toward domestic and international markets.”8  
Billed by the defense ministry that oversees it as one of 
Colombia‟s largest business consortiums, GSED is State-
owned and funded through the national defense budget, with 
proceeds apparently reinvested in the discrete enterprises, 
most of which are typically managed by retired and active 
duty military personnel.   
 
GSED‟s components are wide-ranging.  The most prominent 
are traditional defense industry producers like Indumil 
(armaments, and explosives marketed to the mining sector 
with the national monopoly on production and trade of 
these), CIAC (aeronautics design and maintenance, also for 
the private sector), Cotecmar (the naval engineering and 
construction); and the Logistics Agency, that has the 
formidable task of managing good and services for all of the 
military‟s services.  In addition, GSED includes social 
service enterprises like the Military Hospital and the Public 
Forces‟ pension systems, and a curious mix of “security 
support” enterprises that include Supervigilancia (the 
national agency regulating the private security industry) and 
Satena (the airline that transports passengers and cargo to 
remote and underdeveloped areas of the country).   
 
The creation of GSED is significant in several respects.  It 
reflects an attempt to make a definitive break from past 
practices, in which military enterprises were autonomous 
fiefdoms of the services.  Now, as a grand consortium with 
significant assets (valued in 2006, at the height of the last 
economic boom period in the region, at over US$ 3 billion) 
that place it behind only a handful of Colombia‟s biggest 
                                                 
8
 See the Strategic Orientation section of the consortium‟s website, 
http://www.gsed.gov.co.  
11 
 
corporations, it can market itself as a major actor – not only 
in the otherwise sparse national defense sector, but in the 
national economy as a domestic powerhouse.  This shift also 
reflects a clear effort by the military to qualify in terms of 
savings through efficiencies of scale in the competitive-
entrepreneurial, investor-friendly climate the Uribe 
administration sought to create.
9
   
 
Not least, the creation of GSED is an interesting measure of 
the degree of military institutional autonomy that now exists 
in Colombia.  In the first decades of democracy, from 1958 
to the major state reform of 1991, the military had complete 
autonomy over the management of its enterprises and no-
questions-asked funding by the Congress.
10
  GSED reflects 
the formalized loss of such autonomy, accompanied by 
external audits of military enterprises, which are not the 
norm in Latin America.
11
 
 
However, there are also signs that despite the formal civilian 
“control” the reality is different.  For instance, when the 
defense ministry finally audited the financial records of the 
Military Club in 2011 (apparently it had not done so for 
several years), it found no identifiable bookkeeping practices 
and clear misuse of funds, and fired the retired general in 
                                                 
9
 The initial plan for turning military enterprises into single holding 
company appeared in 2002, the first year of the Uribe administration.  On 
the creation and culture shift of military enterprises, see “La 
„Revolución‟ Militar,” Revista Dinero, April 8, 2006  
http://www.dinero.com/edicion-impresa/negocios/articulo/la-
%E2%80%98revolucion%E2%80%99-militar/35151.   
10
 Author interview with Saúl Rodríguez Hernández, a historian at the 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, August 12, 2011.   
11
 For example, external audits of Indumil are conducted by the 
Department of National Planning, which oversees and coordinates 
economic development policies across government ministries; author 
interview with the director of Indumil, Coronel (R) Michel Martínez 
Poinsenet, August 22, 2011. 
12 
 
charge of the club.
12
  Similarly an audit of the Military 
Hospital the same year revealed at least US$ 25 million in 
fraudulent contracts (paid from public funds), including 
several made with the GSED‟s own Logistics Agency.13  
Shortly after, when the National Comptroller‟s Office 
examined the real estate holdings of the pension funds of 
both the military (Cremil) and police (Casur), it discovered a 
slew of loss-bearing holdings (including the military‟s – now 
GSED‟s – own Hotel Tequendama) that the funds‟ managers 
appeared to ignore, despite the fact that equity in the fund is 
already unlikely to keep up with the growing number of 
retirees from forces that have more than doubled in size from 
the early 1990s.
14
  These cases mirror a broader culture of 
resistance to civilian oversight that is apparent in the 
Colombian forces:  while ultimate authority lies with 
civilians, unless they push hard to assert that authority the 
military is likely to run business as it sees fit.
15
 
 
Private sector enterprises apparently raised no objections to 
the consolidation of military conglomerate, as it is planned to 
complement the private sector and rarely competes with 
domestic producers.
16
  In fact, the creation of GSED reflects 
a full-scale push to transform the national defense sector into 
an internationally-marketable breadwinner for the State, for 
                                                 
12
 “Auditoría interna reveló caso de corrupción en el Club Militar,” 
Colprensa, May 6, 2011. 
13
 “Hospital Militar en la mira de Contraloría por contratos irregulares,” 
El Tiempo (Bogotá), June 29, 2011. 
14
 “Alerta por bienes poco productivos de Fuerza Pública,” El Tiempo 
(Bogotá), June 27, 2011. 
15
 All of the academics and policy analysts, and none of the military 
officers, I interviewed for this project reflected this position.  
16
 Author interviews with Saúl Rodríguez Hernández, and with Alejo 
Vargas Velásquez, a Political Scientist at the Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia, August 30, 2011.  For instance, Indumil has co-production 
agreements with mining companies Cerrejón and Drummond; author 
interview with Indumil Director Martínez Poinsenet. 
13 
 
instance through N.A.T.O. certification, along with the 
production of light aircraft, Israeli-licensed Galil rifles, and 
technologies essential for the lucrative mining sector.   
 
These ambitions also fit well with the foreign military and 
police training programs the Colombian forces have 
developed in recent years and put to use in Afghanistan, 
Mexico and 13 other Latin American and Caribbean 
countries that are struggling to stem the power of drug 
trafficking cartels.  Promoting such foreign training 
programs is now a high priority of the defense ministry, 
which has created a new division to manage growing 
demand for Colombian trainers and to market what the 
ministry terms a “portfolio” of counter-narcotics and anti-
terrorism instruction that will involve participation of 
international defense firms, including the Sikorsky Aircraft 
Corporation that is planning to open a flight simulation 
training center in Colombia by 2012.
17
  In sum, after decades 
of struggling with inadequate resources, the Colombian 
forces have “arrived” as an important security-and-economic 
development agent of the state. 
 
Informal Economic Activities 
In line with formal innovations, the government is expanding 
military roles beyond security provision to include civic 
action in recently recovered areas.  Although Colombian 
forces have long been tasked exclusively with defense and 
security missions, their extensive stationing in the country‟s 
war zones embedded them in the local economy and made 
them an important consumer of local goods and services in 
their deployment zones, for instance obtaining food 
provisions, civilian clothing, construction materials that 
generate ties with local providers who appreciate having 
reliable paying customers.
18
  In short, the military typically 
                                                 
17
 “Colombia Assuming Instructor Role.”   
18
 Author interview with Rodríguez Hernández. 
14 
 
has been not only the primary agent of the national 
government in remote areas, but also a catalyst for local 
production. 
 
Those features are now reappearing in new forms, as Army 
and Marine forces have become the go-to agents for 
implementing major components of Integrated Action 
(Acción Integral) the successor to Plan Colombia.  While 
Plan Colombia provided US$ 7.5 billion in mainly military 
aid to recapture the State from illegal armed groups, 
Integrated Action is intended to extend a largely military 
presence into State presence through nation-building projects 
intended to foster social and economic development and 
more effective rule of law.  Integrated Action was piloted in 
several municipalities primarily in the department of Meta 
south of Bogotá beginning in 2007 and now extends to many 
“consolidation zones.”19  As independent assessments 
emphasize, Integrated Action has had positive results in 
several areas, yet the gains remain far from consolidated as 
of 2011.
20
 
 
In particular, civilian state agencies have been slow in 
getting to work in these zones, leaving the military to carry 
out many of the building and health projects once they have 
                                                 
19
 The consolidation zones are Nariño, Cauca, Valle, Sur del Chocó, Río 
Cagúan, Macarena, Cordillera Central, Oriente Antioqueño, Bajo Cauca, 
Sur de Córdoba, Montes de María, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, 
Putumayo, Arauca, and Catatumbo. 
20
 See the report commissioned by USAID, Caroline Hartzell, Robert D. 
Lamb, Phillip McLean, and Johanna Mendelson Forman, “USAID/OTI‟s 
Initial Governance Response Program in Colombia,” USAID Transition 
Initiatives Evaluation, April 2011 http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-
cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/pubs/Colombia_Final_Evaluation
_Report_April_2011.pdf; and Abigail Poe and Adam Isacson, 
“Stabilization and Development: Lessons of Colombia‟s „Consolidation‟ 
Model,” Center for International Policy, April 2011 
http://justf.org/files/pubs/0411_Col_IPR.pdf . 
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taken control of the area.  This militarization of development 
projects is not surprising, given that the military is the State 
agent best equipped (with manpower, medical corps, 
engineering corps, etc.) to carry out development projects, 
and given that civil-military cooperation in such efforts is 
unprecedented.  In Montes de María, it is the Colombian 
Marines who carried out the survey of the local population‟s 
needs and so became the primary interlocutor of the 
community to government agencies.   
 
Such proaction on the part of the military is admirable, and 
the Marines in particular have been exceptionally effective in 
winning the confidence of local communities.  Yet the 
current activities are insufficient and unsustainable – 
communities need further aid, for instance to build 
functioning justice systems to break ties between local 
government officials and traditional insurgent and 
paramilitary power-holders.  Observers worry that in many 
instances the military has become locked into the 
communities they have incompletely “developed,” and 
leaving them will only unravel the gains accomplished so 
far. 
 
Illicit Economic Activities 
In the case of Colombia, illicit ties between the military and 
traffickers have a long history that dates back as early as the 
1960s, and has typically involved tacit support through 
military toleration.
21
  Evidence continues to surface of 
individual members and units of the military profiting in the 
narco- and war-economy by aiding drug trafficking 
organizations (DTOs) primarily through toleration that takes 
place at the local level in military units, brigades and 
battalions.  Still, overall there is less evidence in recent years 
of illicit profiting by military forces than by the national 
                                                 
21
 The long historical perspective was emphasized by the academics 
Vargas Velásquez  and Rodríguez Hernández.   
16 
 
police and local officials.  And within the military, the navy 
and air force have been less compromised, mainly because 
those services are far smaller and less exposed to local 
criminal groups than their army peers.  It bears noting, as one 
military officer interviewed for this project pointed out, that 
it is easier to document the cases in which officers accepted 
bribes than the ones in which officers were offered bribes but 
declined to take them.
22
   
 
Prominent Cases of Military-Criminal Collusion 
During the last decade, the most scandalous case of military 
collaboration with narcotraffickers was the Jamundí 
massacre in the Valle del Cauca in 2006, in which 10 
members of a top counter-narcotics police unit were killed in 
an ambush, including seven officers vetted by the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA).  The incident made 
shockwaves in Washington that revived debate over 
continued U.S. funding for the Colombian military.  The 
massacre was initially described by then army chief, Gen. 
Mario Montoya, as a terrible case of friendly fire by an army 
patrol, but subsequent evidence implicated the army patrol 
(from a battalion of the Third Division‟s Third Brigade, 
based in Cali) in a set-up to ambush the elite police troops at 
the behest of one of the country‟s most notorious traffickers, 
Diego Montoya, head of the Norte del Valle cartel and on the 
FBI‟s top-ten wanted list.  Fifteen members of the battalion, 
including the commanding coronel, were convicted in civil 
court.  Valle del Cauca is notorious for reports of military-
paramilitary collusion, but this incident was astonishing for 
implying that military units could actively turn on other 
members of the security forces, and for making public the 
resentments that exists between military and police forces.
23
 
                                                 
22
 Author interview with Colombian Navy Captain Ricardo Hurtado, 
August 2, 2011. 
23
 In addition, the army lobbied for a military court as venue for the 
cases, but public attention led the president and attorney general to 
17 
 
Active collusion with criminal groups has reached the 
highest levels in the military, for instance in the case of 
Admiral Gabriel Arango Bacci, found guilty in 2008 by a 
military tribunal of selling U.S. and Colombian naval patrol 
coordinates to narcotraffickers for about US$115,000.  Yet, 
to the dismay of top U.S. Embassy and Colombian Defense 
Ministry officials, Arango‟s appeal of the verdict to civilian 
courts allowed him to be acquitted when a new prosecutor 
suddenly took over the case and threw out much of the 
evidence against the admiral.  The case raised significant 
concerns about the integrity of the justice system.  As then-
U.S. Ambassador William Brownfield stated in a wiki-
leaked embassy cable, “we are keenly aware of the wider 
message here that trying a flag-rank officer in Colombia is 
not only difficult but also risky, a serious concern as the 
USG pushes for prosecution of high-level military officers 
accused of human rights abuses.”24 
 
Illegal arms sales by military forces are reported to be very 
common.
25
  Military stockpiles are not the main source of 
weapons trafficked in Colombia; light arms mainly have 
been smuggled in from Central America and all of 
Colombia‟s neighbors.  Colombia‟s southern-most point, the 
city of Leticia that borders Peru and Brazil has long been a 
haven of smuggling particularly of arms.  According to a 
2003 report by the Rand Corporation, most of the weapons 
trafficked that originate in Colombia were either stolen from 
Indumil factories, typically with collaboration from 
employees or guards, or sold illegally by the security forces; 
                                                                                                    
demand the cases be heard in civilian court.  On the cases, see “54 años 
de cárcel para coronel Bayron Carvajal por muerte de 10 policías y un 
civil en Jamundí,” El Tiempo (Bogotá), May 7, 2008 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-4151086.  
24
 US Embassy in Bogotá, subject “Prosecutor Sinks Case against 
Corrupt Admiral,” November 13, 2009.  Wiki-leaked cable, available at 
http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/11/09BOGOTA3375.html.  
25
 Anonymous contact at the defense ministry consulted for this project. 
18 
 
more recent studies confirm that such patterns continue.
26
  In 
2010, after two years in which 11 battalions reported missing 
arms, munitions and coveted night vision equipment from 
their stockpiles, authorities broke a criminal network linked 
to these thefts.  It involved over 40 people, five of whom 
were from the army and two from the police, and trafficked 
arms to both the FARC and neoparamilitaries.
27
   The 
highest-ranking military officer to be implicated in illegal 
arms sales is former army commander, Gen. Mario Montoya 
Uribe; a notorious former AUC boss testified that as a 
brigade commander in 2002, Montoya made a gift of arms 
and vehicles to AUC forces.  Montoya denies the allegation 
and in 2011 resigned from an ambassadorship to return to 
Colombia and respond to investigative hearings ordered by 
the attorney general.
28
  
 
Cases like these, along with the disturbing discovery of 
classified Colombian military intelligence (including maps 
of a major anti-guerrilla operation) found on FARC 
computer files confiscated in 2007,
29
 which Colombian 
officials said could only have been given by high-ranking 
Colombian officers, prompted then-defense minister Juan 
Manuel Santos to acknowledge publicly that cartels had 
                                                 
26
 Kim Cragin and Bruce Hoffman, Arms Trafficking and Colombia 
(Santa Monica, CA:  Rand Corporation, 2003), 44-47; Nicolás Urrutia, et 
al. Arms Tracing: Perspectives on Control, Traffic, and use of Illegal 
Weapons in Colombia (Bogotá: Fundación Ideas Para la Paz, 2009).  
27
 “Así cayó la red que le vendió armas a los grupos ilegales,” Semana, 
September 21, 2010 http://www.semana.com/nacion/cayo-red-vendio-
armas-grupos-ilegales/144929-3.aspx.  
28
 “General Montoya no incidió en desmovilización del „Cacica 
Gaitana,‟” El Tiempo (Bogotá), September 1, 2011. 
29
 This was a year before the Colombian military raid on FARC 
encampments in Ecuador that led to confiscation of the famous computer 
cache of FARC leader Raúl Reyes that implicates Venezuelan officials in 
narco-FARC ties. 
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infiltrated the army “at a high level” and impeded the capture 
of significant targets.
30
 
 
Since assuming the presidency in 2010, Santos has taken 
important steps to deter such impunity.  Over 150 officers 
were purged and the defense ministry is paying increased 
attention to investigating illicit ties in the military.  As a 
result, the cost of discovery has risen thanks also to more 
effective civilian judicial activism than in the past and 
because the cost of discovery is obviously greater for senior 
officers, according to security policy analyst and long-time 
Colombia researcher Adam Isacson.
31
  Most recently, in July 
2011, Santos passed an Anti-Corruption Law that toughens 
punishment and strengthens institutional capacity, and 
citizen access to information.    
 
Nonetheless, military collaboration with narcotraffickers 
remains remarkably resilient at lower and middle ranks, 
particularly in areas where there is a history of close 
military-paramilitary ties.  Revelations continue to implicate 
army officers, particularly at the unit, brigade and battalion 
level.  For instance, in 2010 a former soldier came forward to 
provide evidence to the attorney general‟s office that 
implicates the 43
rd
 Infantry Battalion in protecting drug 
trafficking routes in Guaviare and Vichada on the border 
with Venezuela, and implicates the battalion commander in 
managing a drug production facility.
32
   
                                                 
30
 Hugh Bronstein, “Colombia Admits High-Level Military Corruption,” 
Reuters, July 30, 2007 http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/07/30/us-
colombia-corruption-army-idUSN3042454420070730.  
31
 Author interview with Adam Isacson, Director of the Regional 
Security Policy Program at the Washington Office on Latin America, 
June 23, 2011. 
32
 The story aired in Noticias Uno, “Colombian Army Cocaine 
Trafficking Exposed,” Justice for Colombia, October 20, 2010. 
http://www.justiceforcolombia.org/Colombian-Army-Cocaine-
Trafficking-Exposed.  
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Government policies have also thwarted efforts to stem such 
ties.  Throughout the second half of the 2000s, the 
Colombian government underestimated the scale and 
capacities of the criminal groups that were emerging in the 
wake of the paramilitary demobilization that began in 2005.  
Rather than simple “criminal bands” (bandas criminales, or 
bacrim), as the government called them, these groups are 
now widely recognized as reconstituted “neoparamilitaries” 
that are resourced much like their antecedents (i.e., armed 
through their drug trafficking ties and able to launder their 
profits through land acquisitions), continue to operate in the 
same areas as earlier,
33
 and therefore retain access to drug 
production zones and trafficking routes.
34
   Though Uribe 
staff members, defense ministry officials and military 
commanders were briefed on the regrouping of paramilitaries 
as early as 2006; no efforts were taken to counter this.
35
  As 
                                                 
33
 “Map Highlights Striking Similarities between Former Paramilitary 
and “Bacrim” Territory,” Colombia Reports, June 17, 2011.  
http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/17040-map-highlights-
striking-similarities-between-former-paramilitary-and-bacrim-
territory.html. 
34
 Paramilitary leaders received amnesties for bringing in their 
underlings.  It is typically reported that only about 15 percent of the 
former paramilitaries have reconstituted themselves, but this obscures 
assessments that a large proportion, over 53 percent, of the bosses of 
these new groups are former AUC “lieutenants” who have successfully 
recruited many neophytes to their organizations.  So while 
neoparamilitaries number only about 6,000 by official assessments in 
early 2011, they retain experienced leadership structures and existing 
networks of associates from which to build out their new activities.  
“¿Neoparamilitares?” Revista Semana, June 4, 2011  
http://www.semana.com/nacion/neoparamilitares/157914-3.aspx. 
35
 AUC leaders told Colombian and OAS officials that their lieutenants 
had become uncontrollable and were not “coming in,” and the OAS 
demobilization support mission informed Colombian officials that 
paramilitary leaders were turning over common criminals posing as their 
subordinates while real paras were regrouping into criminal 
organizations.  “Documentos de Wikileaks revelan información 
contundente sobre las Bacrim,” El País (Cali), February 22, 2011 
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a result, new groups like the Aguilas Negras, ERPAC, 
Paisas, Rostrojos, and Urabeños have been allowed to 
flourish.
36
 
 
Neoparamilitary Ties 
Some military taboos remain enormously powerful in 
Colombia:  military forces are hardly ever implicated in 
lucrative ties to the FARC‟s drug trafficking operations, and 
similarly there is no credible evidence of direct illegal ties 
between members of the Colombian and Venezuelan 
militaries, due to the countries‟ poor relations and strong 
mistrust between their militaries.  Yet as in the prior 
paramilitary period, 1985 to 2005, neoparamilitaries receive 
cover and sometimes active support from members of the 
security forces, justice system, and elected officials.  Local 
residents have given human rights groups chilling accounts 
of how state authorities frequently ignore the presence of 
neo-paramilitaries in their communities, effectively 
tolerating their existence.  As a man in the Andean town of 
Santa Cruz told Human Rights Watch in 2009: 
 
In Madrigal ... the Black Eagles [Aguilas 
Negras] interrogate us, with the police 20 
                                                                                                    
http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/noticias/documentos-wikileaks-
revelan-auc-advierten-sus-mandos-medios-volverian-inmanejable.  On 
the government thereafter still maintaining that demobilization was 
proceeding as intended, see Hannah Stone, “Fake Colombian 
Demobilization Stories Explain Rise of BACRIMs,” InsightCrime, 
March 11, 2011.  http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-
news/item/666-fake-colombian-demobilization-stories-explain-rise-of-
bacrim. 
36
 Neo-paramilitaries are particularly prevalent in the coastal provinces of 
Chocó (bordering Panama) and Nariño (bordering Ecuador), and the 
interior province of Meta (south of Bogotá), and according to national 
police assessments as of July 2009 they were widely present in at least 
173 municipalities in 24 of Colombia‟s 32 departments.  Human Rights 
Watch, Paramilitaries’ Heirs: The New Face of Violence in Colombia 
(New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, February 2010). 
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meters away...  [Y]ou can’t trust the army or 
police because they’re practically with the 
guys...  In Santa Cruz and Santa Rosa we 
have the ‘Rastrojos.’  They arrived in March 
or April.  They arrived ... in camouflaged 
uniform.  They’re a lot, 100, 150, 300 – 
they’ve grown a lot...”37  
 
Confirming those tendencies are dozens of cases currently 
under judicial investigation of civilian and security officials 
taking bribes from the Rastrojos, which are based in the 
country‟s southwestern Pacific coastal departments and 
count among the most strategic, flexible and broadly 
operating of the paramilitary successor groups.
38
   In 2010 a 
military lawyer was arrested for accepting US$150,000 
monthly from the Rastrojos in exchange for information he 
intercepted from tapping the phones of several security 
agencies.
39
  The high payment value suggests the 
information received was significant.  More recently, 
defectors from the group turned over payroll records 
implicating dozens of officials in Bajo Cauca – primarily 
civilians and police, but also local DAS agents and members 
of the military‟s anti-kidnapping unit, GAULA (payments 
for these individuals were significantly smaller, about US$ 
                                                 
37
 Cited in Human Rights Watch, Paramilitaries’ Heirs, p. 9; there are 
numerous similar accounts from locals in the report. 
38
 The Rastrojos are strategic and flexible in that they are willing to make 
necessary alliances with both insurgent groups and former paramilitaries 
alike; on this and other groups, see “Colombia‟s New Armed Groups,” 
The International Crisis Group, Latin America Group Report No. 20, 
May 10, 2007. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-
america/colombia/20_colombia_s_new_armed_groups.pdf ; and the 
portrait of the group summarized at Insight Crime, 
http://insightcrime.org/criminal-groups/colombia/rastrojos/item/63-
rastrojos-profile.  
39
 U.S. State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report, Colombia Report, March 3, 2011. 
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1,000-3,000).
40
  Previously, six lower-rank navy officers 
were charged with accepting bribes from the Rastrojos in 
exchange for allowing drug shipments to transit in the port of 
Tumaco, and as of mid 2011, 700 members of the security 
forces – about 350 from the army, 300 police, 30 DAS, and 
nine from the navy – are under investigation for complicity 
with paramilitary successor groups.
41
 Overall, these are 
many cases, but there is little evidence of extensive high-
level military corruption – again, it is most common at the 
lower to middle ranks.   
 
False Positives  
If taking bribes from drug traffickers is bad, still more 
egregious is the killing of more than 3,000
42
 innocent 
civilians by military forces that inflated casualty tallies in 
order to receive bonus payments, vacation time and other 
perks for troops and units.  Over 3,800 officers and troops 
have been implicated.  Following from a “body count 
syndrome” that dates back at least to 1990 as documented in 
declassified U.S. government cables;
43
 the majority of cases 
                                                 
40
 Elyssa Pachico, “Colombia‟s New Generation Drug Gangs: The Power 
to Corrupt,” Insight Crime, August 15, 2011 
http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1401-colombias-
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 “¿Neoparamilitares?” Verdad Abierta, June 6, 2011 
http://www.verdadabierta.com/rearmados/50-rearmados/3308-
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42
 This is the estimate of the U.N.‟s Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, based on the number of cases under investigation by the 
Prosecutor General‟s Office, plus the active cases and the uncertain 
number of cases in the military justice system. 
43
 A 1994 U.S. Embassy cable reported that “‟Body Count‟ mentalities 
persist, especially among Colombian Army officers.  Field commanders 
who cannot show track records of aggressive anti-guerrilla activity 
(wherein the majority of the military‟s human rights abuses occur) 
disadvantage themselves at promotion time.” Cable of US Embassy in 
Colombia, “MOD Invites A/S Shattuck to Visit Colombia,” October 21, 
1994, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/colombia/19941021.pdf.  See also 
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of the False Positives took place between 2004 and 2008, 
when the first cases were revealed.  They involved forces 
from at least 33 brigades in luring young men, women and 
even war veterans to remote areas with the promise of work 
and then killing them and dressing them in guerrilla uniforms 
to be passed off as legitimate casualties of the war. 
 
The initial revelations in 2008, which were shocking even in 
war-hardened Colombian society, led President Uribe to fire 
27 military officers, including three generals, for command 
responsibilities in the false tallies.  However, the abuses are 
not surprising in the context of persistent body count 
mentalities in the army, the president‟s focus on decimating 
the insurgency, and the remarkable secret defense ministry 
directive from 2005 that spelled out in 14 pages the structure 
of bonus payments and benefits that could be achieved by 
military troops if they captured or killed leaders of illegal 
armed groups or brought arms or valuable information to 
authorities.
44
   
 
The conflict in Colombia has drawn greater oversight from 
human rights organizations, and more thorough U.S. State 
Department vetting of military units to qualify on their 
human rights record for U.S. aid, than any other 
contemporary war.  As a result, the military has made 
important strides in human rights training and has become 
more effective in disciplining forces for rights violations.  
Nonetheless, the False Positives cases indicate that the 
practice of illegal killings has persisted through the 2000s, 
                                                                                                    
Cable of US Embassy in Colombia, “Human Rights in Colombia – 
Widespread Allegations of Abuses by the Army,”  July 27, 1990, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/colombia/19900727.pdf. 
44
 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Directiva Ministerial Permanente No. 
29/2005, Bogotá, November 17, 2005. The secret directive is available at 
the Colombian news site La Silla Vacía, 
http://www.lasillavacia.com/historia/2357.  
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and human rights groups document that virtually every army 
territorial brigade and most mobile brigades have been 
implicated to some degree in such killings in this decade.
45
   
 
The False Positives cases point to an incomplete military 
reform agenda and a lack of military accountability to 
civilian-led justice institutions.  These issues are particularly 
worrisome given the defense ministry‟s agenda to “export” 
Colombian military training for the counter-drug wars of 
Mexican, Central American and other countries‟ forces.  
While Colombian forces clearly have extensive experience 
and are with certainty the most practiced counter-insurgency 
fighters in Latin America, model tactics and strategies 
exported in the region need to give careful attention to the 
protection of civilian populations.  This is particularly 
important because Colombians are training forces from 
countries that are overwhelmed by criminal groups, eager for 
solutions and in most cases themselves carry weak records in 
protecting civilians‟ rights. 
 
In sum, there is little evidence that illicit activities in the 
military ranks have diminished in the last several years as the 
insurgency has wound down.  In fact, criminal groups that 
seek out military facilitators are thriving in Colombia.  
Staving off the temptation to collude with these groups will 
remain difficult for a force given the high marks that 
political elites and large sectors of Colombian society now 
concede to it, leaving little incentive for self-critique.  Yet if 
                                                 
45
 This implicates also U.S.-funded units, as virtually every Army 
territorial brigade and most mobile brigades have been implicated in the 
over 3,100 extrajudicial killings documented by the Human Rights 
Observatory of the Colombia‐Europe‐United States Coordination, which 
maintains an extensive database of cases.  See the letter signed by 15 
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troubles in the military reflect troubles of the larger political 
society, what should be done?   
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
 
Colombia‟s experience of a decades-long war that has still 
not ended creates particular challenges for policies intended 
to limit the autonomy of the military and make it clearly 
accountable to elected political authority and to the rule of 
law.  A larger political culture in which political elites have 
maintained durable ties with illegal armed groups further 
complicates the challenge.  Still, the challenge needs to be 
addressed if stable security and eventually a nationwide 
peace are to develop in a context of democracy.   
 
The prestige and initiative the Colombian forces have gained 
in the last decade are reflected in the wide range of economic 
activities they have taken on.  The military‟s economic 
portfolio may appear diverse and dynamic, but it really 
reflects a worrying sprawl in many directions that public 
officials do not seem to have full control over.  It makes 
sense to consolidate military enterprises to gain efficiencies, 
but not if the result still remains elusive to civilian oversight.  
It makes sense to draw on military know-how to implement 
emergency and short-term development projects, but only if 
efforts also go toward building civilian capacity to carry out 
such projects and toward promoting effective, 
complementary work between military and civilian agencies 
in these settings.  And it may make sense to use the greatly 
expanded military and police forces, which currently total 
about 428,000 for a country the size of Texas and California 
combined, in auxiliary roles (civic action, oil security) as 
conflict winds down, but only if a forward-looking plan for 
gradually downsizing these forces is also underway.
46
   
                                                 
46
 Some observers worry that military multi-tasking helps the government 
to avoid the inevitable political choices of either painful downsizing or 
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One of the greatest challenges to the professional integrity of 
the armed forces is avoiding the dangerous lure of 
association with criminal groups.  Even after decades of coca 
crop eradication, Colombia remains the top cocaine producer 
in the world, and the biggest exporter of the drug to the U.S. 
market.  Drug trafficking is unlikely to disappear, so the 
challenge for Colombia and its neighbors is to diminish its 
most debilitating effects.  The gateway to durable reforms 
requires creating State institutions that allow for greater 
transparency, which can strengthen public insight and 
therefore oversight, and creating clear incentives and 
penalties to encourage public officials to act in accordance 
with the rule of law.  For Colombia, with respect to the 
military in particular, there are additional recommendations 
worth considering: 
 
Break military-paramilitary ties through more effective 
and empowered independent oversight.  The Colombian 
government should champion breaking existing ties between 
the military and paramilitary successor groups and should 
actively pursue them for demobilization.  The U.S. should 
strongly support such efforts.  Investigative journalists, 
human rights groups, and U.N. and O.A.S. observers have 
documented continued ties, but the Colombian political 
system lacks specialized institutions for overseeing the 
military – for instance, Congress has no committee 
specialized in military affairs.
47
 
 
Instead, the burden of oversight falls to more general 
institutions (those not focused on the military), in particular 
the Prosecutor General‟s Office, which investigates and 
prosecutes criminal offenses, and the Inspector General‟s 
                                                                                                    
painful taxation to maintain the forces.  Author interview with political 
scientist Nazih Richani, an expert in the political economy of Colombia, 
August 1, 2011.   
47
 Author interview with Colombian political scientist Alejo Vargas. 
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Office, which investigates misconduct by public officials 
including the state security forces.  Those offices need to be 
empowered further with additional resources and 
investigative capacity.  Such initiatives should be backed 
directly by   the president‟s office.  Effective coercive 
capacity is needed to deter the resumption of illicit 
associations and to investigate and punish those associations.  
 
Routinely Investigate the Possibility of Military Collusion 
with DTOs.  The U.S. can aid in this process by encouraging 
mechanisms for potential informants, who would otherwise 
fear coming forward with damaging information about 
military impunity, to indeed come forward.
48
  It is worth 
noting that while many paramilitary bosses who accepted the 
amnesty gave testimony about corrupt military associates, 
they mostly implicated officers who were dead or had retired 
– they rarely implicated officers in active service for fear that 
their families could face military retribution.
49
   Similarly, 
when narcotraffickers are extradited to the U.S., authorities 
should routinely examine all their ties, including the 
possibility that there might be ties to military officers.   
 
Adopt Mano Dura Policies for Military Collusion with 
DTOs.  Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all 
ranks found to have ties with criminal groups.  Leverage the 
risk of losing rank, pension rights and other benefits 
appropriate to the scale of the crime. 
 
Reward Military Units that have Clean Records.  Target 
foreign military aid to units and services that have the most 
scrupulous records in avoiding corruption and criminal ties – 
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 For instance, the U.S. State Department‟s 2010 Human Rights Report 
for Colombia notes that witness protection programs left out many 
potential informants who then refused to testify for fear of retribution. 
49
 Author interview with Adam Isacson. 
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in other words, pay as much attention to success cases as to 
problem cases. 
 
Demilitarize Civic Action and Development Assistance.  
Reduce military involvement in civic action and 
development assistance as soon as possible; where such 
missions become necessary, they should be short-term and 
only specially trained and vetted units should be used for 
them. 
 
Build Significant Civilian Capacity for Postwar 
Reconstruction.  Build effective civilian sector capacity to 
address development issues, to allow the military to focus on 
defense and limited security missions.  Taking the military 
out of development work would be a historic transformation 
in many Latin American countries, but creating rapidly 
deployable go-to civilian agencies, similar to the Peace 
Corps, is more important than ever in the region. 
 
In many respects, the nature and consequences of its long, 
unfinished internal war make Colombia exceptional in the 
region.  This is just as true for the recent expansion in the 
military‟s economic activities.  That expansion is inspired by 
the apparent military strategic successes of the last decade, 
but enabled and promoted mainly by civilian elites who now 
rely heavily on the armed forces as the proxy for an effective 
State presence in many key regions.  The Colombian 
“exception” is that all this is happening in a democratic 
regime, with significant approval from civilian political 
elites eager to draw on the successes of “democratic 
security” in marketing the military industries‟ products and 
the military‟s new foreign training programs.50   Elsewhere 
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 Though Colombian defense and military logistics enterprises have 
existed for many decades, since at least the 1960s, they never had a 
meaningful presence in international markets and were not known for 
30 
 
in the region, when the military orchestrated its break out as 
an economic actor – championing defense-related 
industrialization in Argentina and Brazil, or creating and 
running State enterprises to promote wider social and 
economic development in Ecuador or Cuba – the context was 
military-authoritarian, and the initiative almost never 
civilian.
51
   
 
Because Colombia‟s civilian political elites basically fear the 
risks of significantly reducing the armed forces‟ national 
footprint, they seem to be willing to accept the militarization 
of security consolidation policies, and the persistence of 
illicit collusion with criminal groups.  Yet championing 
military enterprises and relying on the military for civic 
action projects is no substitute for building civilian capacity.  
At best it allows government leaders to avoid making tough 
political choices, but at worst it can lead to the unintended 
outcome of a long-term militarization of the State‟s 
economic initiatives that is burdensome and inappropriate for 
democracy.   
 
                                                                                                    
innovative design or joint venture strategies, unlike peers born in roughly 
the same era in Argentina and Brazil.  
51
 See Mani, “Military Entrepreneurship” and “Military Entrepreneurs.” 
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